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Studies of the American public demonstrate that partisans often diverge not only on
questions of opinion but on matters of fact. However, little is known about partisan
divergence in factual beliefs among the government officials who make real policy de-
cisions or how it compares to the public. We therefore conduct the first systematic
comparison of factual belief polarization between the public and government officials
using a paired survey approach. Our results indicate that political elites are consis-
tently more accurately informed than the public across a wide range of politically
contentious facts. However, this increase in accuracy does not translate into reduced
factual belief polarization. These findings demonstrate that a more informed political
elite does not necessarily mitigate partisan factual disagreement in policymaking.
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Contemporary polarization in American politics is often marked by disagreement over not
just matters of opinion, but matters of fact (e.g., Frankovic 2016, 2018; Roush and Sood
N.d.). Polarized factual beliefs can undermine debate on issues ranging from climate change
to end-of-life care (Ding et al. 2011; Nyhan 2010). To date, however, existing studies of
partisan disagreement over factual matters have largely consisted of surveys of the mass
public, neglecting the beliefs of the government officials who actually make policy decisions.
This study reports the results of parallel surveys that provide the first direct comparison of
factual belief polarization between government officials and the public. Our surveys measured
beliefs about six controversial policy issues (including the prevalence of voter fraud, the tax
burden on the rich, and the safety of genetically modified foods) and two salient population
quantities (the number of unemployed and foreign born residents). For each issue, we consider
both overall accuracy and the degree of belief polarization.1
We find that government officials are consistently more accurately informed than the mass
public across a range of politically contentious facts. However, this increase in accuracy does
not reduce the overall degree of factual belief polarization. These findings suggest government
officials’ factual beliefs may reflect both the incentives they face to be accurately informed
about policy-relevant facts and the pressures to hold beliefs congenial to their partisan
preferences. Taken together, this study demonstrates that a more informed political elite
does not necessarily mitigate partisan factual disagreement in policymaking.
Theoretical approach
Partisans frequently diverge in not just their policy preferences but also in their factual be-
liefs. We call the latter phenomenon factual belief polarization. Though partisan knowledge
1Our pre-registered hypotheses and analyses focus exclusively on factual belief polarization. We
hypothesized that, because elites tend to be more polarized than the public on policy preferences,
they would also be more polarized on matters of opinion. As we discuss below, however, our results
are more easily understood when considering factual accuracy directly.
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gaps are smaller than many assume (Roush and Sood N.d.), misperceptions are widespread
among the public, especially among people for whom the claims are politically congenial
(e.g., Frankovic 2016, 2018). As a result, partisan differences in factual beliefs are larger for
misinformation-related topics than for other issues (Roush and Sood N.d.).
In this study, we extend research on factual belief polarization to also consider political
elites, a term we use to describe people in positions of influence and power in U.S. politics.
Elites might be thought to hold less polarized beliefs than the public. First, they tend
to be more knowledgeable, which is associated with greater belief accuracy (Gottfried et al.
2013). In addition, elites possess domain expertise in politics and public policy that could
reduce the influence of cognitive biases. Kahan et al. (2015) find, for instance, that judges
display less bias in legal reasoning than law students or the mass public, which they attribute
to “legal training and experience.” Finally, elites potentially face external scrutiny from the
media and other political actors if they reveal inaccurate beliefs (Nyhan and Reifler 2015).
However, based on prior research, we evaluated the pre-registered hypothesis that factual
belief polarization would be greater among elites than the public.2 First, studies typically
find that elites have more polarized preferences than the public (e.g., Bafumi and Herron
2010) and higher levels of issue constraint (e.g., Lupton, Myers, and Thornton 2015). Sec-
ond, higher levels of education or knowledge, which we expect to observe among elites, are
associated with higher levels of attitude-consistent factual beliefs in many partisan factual
controversies (e.g., Kahan et al. 2017). Finally, evidence suggests that these tendencies do
not appear to be effectively constrained by political incentives — recent research documents
systematic elite error in perceptions of public opinion that is correlated with their own pref-
erences (Broockman and Skovron 2018).
In addition, we examine whether elites hold more accurate factual beliefs than the public.
While this outcome measure was not preregistered, considering accuracy differences aids in
understand our preregistered findings. Our findings specifically challenge the seemingly
2We preregistered two other hypotheses that were not supported. See Online Appendix D for details.
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widespread expectation that belief accuracy and belief polarization are inversely related,
which may seem to be intuitive. For instance, some studies show that interventions which
increase belief accuracy also reduce partisan or ideological belief polarization, while others
find that exposure to misinformation can not only decrease belief accuracy but widen belief
polarization (e.g., van der Linden, Leiserowitz, and Maibach 2018; Guess et al. 2020). This
expectation was recently displayed in media coverage of the Bullock, Gerber, and Hill (2015)
finding that offering financial incentives for accurate answers decreased partisan polarization
on factual survey questions. One headline stated, for instance, “Attention fact-checkers:
Dangle a buck in front of partisans and they’ll come closer to the truth” (Benton 2013). But
as Bullock and Lenz (2019, 337) write,
“[a]lthough accuracy incentives used by Bullock et al. (2015) and Prior et al.
(2015) clearly reduce partisan differences in survey responses, it is not as clear
that they cause respondents to answer more accurately. Bullock et al. do not
examine the effects of incentives on accuracy. Prior et al. (2015, especially p.
503) do examine the effects of incentives on accuracy, although these effects are
not their focus; they find that incentives increase accuracy in their first study
but not in their second.”
In fact, belief polarization can be unchanged or widen when belief accuracy increases. For
instance, Jerit and Barabas (2012) show that belief accuracy increases for issues with greater
media coverage, but these increases are concentrated among partisans for whom those facts
are politically congenial, creating greater belief polarization and greater belief accuracy.
The present study provides important descriptive evidence about relative belief polar-
ization of government officials and the mass public. While we find that government officials
possess more accurate factual beliefs than the mass public, they are just as polarized.
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Data and methods
We analyze survey data from national samples of government officials and the American
public. Our study was preregistered and can be found online at https://osf.io/qap3c.3
Replication data and code are posted at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RNPR9U.
Our government official data comes from a national online survey panel of local and
state government officials through CivicPulse.4 CivicPulse is a nonprofit organization that
maintains a comprehensive list of elected policymakers, legislative staffers, and top adminis-
trative positions in local and state government in the United States. From this list, a random
sample of officials were invited to participate in a confidential survey between February 23
and April 28, 2017. A total of 743 officials from all fifty states participated in the survey.
Below we refer to this sample of survey participants as “government officials,” though we
note that they specifically represent officials in state and local government who are involved
in making or administering policy. Specifically, 75% of the sample is comprised of elected
policymakers, with the other 25% representing legislative staffers and top-level bureaucrats
(e.g., city managers).
The public data were collected from April 7–19, 2017 by Ipsos-MORI among 2000 re-
spondents in their opt-in Internet panel. Quotas for gender, age, and region were applied.5
We asked respondents in both surveys factual belief questions about four controversial
issues where misperceptions are common: voter fraud, climate change, federal spending, and
taxes paid by the wealthy, which we refer to these as “issue beliefs” (see Online Appendix
A for question wording). These issues were chosen because they were salient, controversial,
and expected to be balanced with respect to partisan congeniality. The voter fraud question
3The preregistration discusses additional analyses that would pair elite data from the National
Candidate Survey (NCS) with public data from the American National Election Studies (ANES).
We lack access to the NCS data, so these analyses are omitted. Other deviations are noted below.
4www.civicpulse.org
5See Online Appendix B for further details on both samples. As we show there, the Ipsos sample
overrepresents college graduates, but results are similar in our YouGov sample (see below). Also,
per our preregistration, we do not use survey weights because we pool public and survey data.
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asks respondents how many votes were cast in the 2016 presidential election by people who
should have been ineligible or who voted more than once. Respondents used a five-point scale
ranging from “less than a thousand” to “millions.” The climate change question asks whether
the world’s temperature has been increasing over the last 100 years. The two remaining issue
questions asked whether the federal government spends more on health care or the military
and for respondents’ estimates of the share of federal income tax paid by the top 1 percent
of earners. In addition to these questions about beliefs on controversial issues, we also asked
respondents for their beliefs about the number of unemployed and foreign born Americans,
two salient population quantities that people frequently overestimate (e.g., Horsley 2017;
Kessler 2019).6 Specifically, we ask respondents to estimate both how many people out of
100 were “born outside the United States” and how many “are currently unemployed” among
those “who have a job or are actively looking for a job.” We call these “population beliefs.”7
To expand the pool of data we analyze, we also provide non-preregistered analyses of data
collected from government officials and the public on two additional issues — beliefs in the
misperceptions that needle exchanges increase drug use (which we expected would be more
common among Republicans) and that GMO foods are unsafe for human consumption (which
we expected would be more common among Democrats). While the elite data for these two
issues comes from a random subset of our CivicPulse sample of government officials, the
public survey data comes from a nationally representative survey administered on YouGov
in December 2016 rather than the Ipsos survey described above.8
As specified in our preregistration, each closed-ended belief accuracy measure is coded
on a 0–1 scale where higher values indicate greater accuracy. More formally, 0 is the least
6We also measured perceptions of the local unemployed and foreign born population (see Online
Appendix D for an analysis of these results).
7This approach is consistent with previous research (Sides and Citrin 2007). Our unemployment
question wording is meant to mirror the official definition of the term. As with any survey, we must
rely on accurate self-reporting of respondent beliefs.
8The YouGov data were collected as part of a survey experiment so we only use data from the
control condition. See Online Appendix A for descriptive statistics.
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accurate response, 1 is the most accurate response, and other responses take the values i
n
for response options i = {2, . . . , n−1}.9 For our open-ended population beliefs, the measure
is calculated as 1− |e−y|
100
where e is the respondent estimate of the quantity in question on a
0–100 scale and y is the true population value.10
Results
We first plot factual belief polarization among the public and government officials on eight
controversial issues and population quantities. Figure 1 plots average belief accuracy for
government officials (represented as solid squares) and members of the public (represented
as hollow triangles) by party. (Independents are not plotted separately for visual clarity but
are included in the other tables and figures reported below.) As the figure indicates, only one
issue (voter fraud) produces the preregistered expectation of greater elite belief polarization
(i.e., partisan government officials are more polarized than their public counterparts). How-
ever, we consistently observe higher levels of accuracy among government officials. On the
other seven issues, mean accuracy levels are uniformly higher among officials in both parties
than among their co-partisan counterparts in the public. Moreover, three issues show a pat-
tern in which officials on both sides have more accurate beliefs than partisans on either side
(GMO safety, the foreign-born population, and the unemployment rate).
The systematic differences we observe in belief accuracy between government officials
and the public are more clearly summarized in Figure 2, which presents the mean differences
in belief accuracy for government officials when pooled compared to members of the public
9“Don’t know” responses, which were offered as an explicit option for the needle exchange and GMO
questions but not the other issue measures, are treated as missing. See Online Appendix A for the
exact wording and details on how we coded the responses.
10This coding represents a deviation from our preregistration that we have chosen so that higher values
consistently indicate greater accuracy across all outcome measures. (The preregistered coding was
that higher values would indicate larger unemployed or more foreign born populations. However,
results are equivalent using the preregistered coding; see Online Appendix E.)
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Differences in belief accuracy between government officials and members of the public. Beliefs are measured on a 0–1 scale
where 1 represents the most accurate response (see Online Appendix A for question wording). The vertical line represents the
midpoint by issue between mean belief accuracy among Democratic and Republican members of the public (including leaners).
Public partisanship was measured using self-placement on a seven-point measure(with leaners treated as partisans). We code
government officials as partisans if they ran for office as a partisan or identified as Democrats or Republicans (including leaners).
across all eight outcome measures. As the figure illustrates, differences in mean accuracy
range from 0.09 (for climate change and health care spending) to 0.16 (for GMO safety) by
issue. In each case, we can reject the null of no difference between groups (p < .01) — elites
are always more accurate than the public on average.
OLS models in Table 1 formally test for differences in belief polarization and accuracy
between government officials and members of the public controlling for a series of preregis-
tered covariates.11 We observe relatively little evidence of greater belief polarization among
government officials compared to the public. When we compute the relevant quantities of
11These findings are robust using ordered probit instead (if appropriate); see Online Appendix C.
We also note two deviations from our preregistration. First, we omit a planned pooled model
of responses to the questions that do not concern population quantities due to the addition of
new issues and ambiguity about how to pool across issues given the varying relationship between
partisanship and accuracy by issue. We also exclude control variables for appointed and elected
officials so we can estimate an overall coefficient for government officials.
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Differences in belief accuracy between government officials and members of the public with 95% confidence intervals. Beliefs
are measured on a 0–1 scale where 1 represents the most accurate response (see Online Appendix A for question wording). The
vertical line represents mean belief accuracy by issue for all respondents in the public sample.
Table 1: Issue belief accuracy by partisanship and elite status
Health care Tax share GMO Voter Climate Needle Foreign-born Unemploy.
spending from 1% safety fraud change exchanges natl. rate natl. rate
Democrat -0.05* -0.04 0.10 0.02 0.06** 0.09 -0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Republican 0.14*** 0.14*** -0.03 -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.13* -0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01)
Govt. official 0.07 -0.00 0.24** 0.11** 0.15*** 0.05 0.05** 0.06***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02)
Democrat × official -0.02 0.09 -0.23** 0.08* -0.06 0.04 0.02 0.03
(0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02)
Republican × official -0.01 0.10 -0.05 -0.08* -0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02
(0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02)
Control variables X X X X X X X X
N 2591 2592 465 2591 2590 510 2578 2470
* p < 0.10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variables are measured on a 0–1 scale where 1 is the most accurate response. Control variables are indicators for
sex, college degree, nonwhite, and age ranges 30–44, 45–64, and 65 and older. Partisanship was measured using self-placement
on a seven-point party ID measure (with leaners treated as partisans) for the public. We code government officials as partisans
if they reported running for office as a partisan or identified as Democrats or Republicans (including leaners).
interest from the results in the table, we only observe evidence of greater elite polarization
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at the p < .05 level for voter fraud (see Table C2 in the Online Appendix for details).12
By contrast, government officials provide more accurate responses than the public on five of
eight issues tested (p < .01 for two issues; p < .05 for three).
Conclusion
We provide the first comparison of factual belief polarization between political elites and the
public. Using a paired survey approach, we find that government officials hold more accurate
beliefs than the public across a range of politically contentious issues. However, the greater
accuracy we observe among officials is not associated with reduced belief polarization.
These results challenge the assumption that belief accuracy and belief polarization are
inversely related; increased factual accuracy among political elites does not necessarily trans-
late into greater factual agreement across partisan lines. These findings may reflect the com-
peting motivations government official face to hold accurate beliefs about policy-relevant
facts and to adopt beliefs that support their partisan preferences.
Future research should address several limitations of the present study. First, it would be
valuable to explore cross-issue variation in factual belief polarization between the public and
elites. Our findings are largely consistent but we do observe notable heterogeneity across
issues, especially on voter fraud and GMO safety. Second, scholars should more closely
examine the direction and nature of the relationship between factual belief polarization and
opinion polarization. Finally, researchers should seek to evaluate the extent to which factual
belief polarization affects the policymaking process.
For now, however, these results provide important new evidence about the extent of
polarization — especially among government officials — and how it relates to factual beliefs.
Learning more about the sources of the partisan divide over facts and its consequences for
12In addition, we observe significant differences in belief polarization on GMO safety due to a sign
reversal — GOP elites have more accurate beliefs than Democratic elites but the opposite is true
for the public. This finding does not clearly support our expectations of greater elite polarization.
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both elites and the public will be essential for understanding American democracy in this
polarized age.
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